I wish I knew game theory.
Here is the problem:
There are conventional companies, secret intelligence agencies, and countries.
companies belong to one country, and companies can use secret intelligence agencies to spy on any other company, and the country has the ability to regulate how it’s companies can use it’s secret intelligence agencies to spy (as in, how much spying it allows it’s company to use.)
The players are countries and the reward is the net corporate fitness. What is the equilibrium state of this system?
Here are the factors to consider. If the companies do not spy, it will obviously fail to anticipate other companies products and pricing, and therefore will fail to compete effectively.
If all the company does is to spy, then it loses the ability to be productive and create original products or form independent product lines. When the company loses enough capability as it spends more and more time copying and coping with competitors, then it dies.
Here are some other possibilities: What if the company only spied on foreign companies? Or the country directs the spying activities to manipulate which company succeeds and which one doesn’t?
What are the optimal strategies for countries?
What if companies can chose to accept spying offered by the country or not, what would be their optimal strategies?
…. damn it, wish I paid more attention in my game theory class in college.